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I warmly welcome LITTLE et al.͛s ;ϮϬϭ7Ϳ paper which examines the potential of voluntary risk-based 
trading as an initiative to improve bTB risk information exchange between cattle sellers and buyers when 
cattle are sold. The mixed method analysis is based on a representative survey of cattle farmers iŶ ͚high͛ 
aŶd ͚loǁ͛ ďTB risk areas iŶ EŶglaŶd combined with focus group and other qualitative and secondary data. 
It provides useful insights into farmer perceptions of market-based bTB governance and it raises wider 
questions about the logic of using market-based instruments to deal with a complex animal disease such 
as bTB. I highlight below key findings that struck me as useful and significant, particularly geographical 
differences in the data, and link these findings to wider research in the social science biosecurity literature 
on risk perception and geography which suggests there is incompatibility between farmers and bTB policy 
because of place-sensitive farmer beliefs about bTB and nature and neoliberal models of animal health 
which are insensitive to place differences.   
The surǀeǇ data is stratified to eǆaŵiŶe farŵer perĐeptioŶs iŶ ͚high͛ aŶd ͚loǁ͛ risk areas. There are 
important geographical differences in the data, which reflect differences in farmer perceptions of bTB risk 
in the two risk areas. For example, in terms of cattle trading practices, the risk of bringing in bTB was 
significantly more important (as a risk score) for farmers in low bTB risk areas. This is perhaps to be 
expected. Interestingly, respondents from low risk areas were more positive about having sufficient 
information to assess bTB status of cattle (87%) than those in high bTB risk areas (68%). Cattle trading 
patterns also vary in the two risk areas: 73% of farmers said they do not bring cattle in from high risk areas 
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– most farmers in high risk areas said this compared to 57% in high risk areas. When farmers were asked 
about the usefulness of information, farmers in low risk areas were more positive than farmers in high 
bTB risk areas. Moreover, when buyers were asked if they would support a voluntary cattle trading 
scheme just over half would support such an initiative (suggesting farmers generally are tentative) but the 
response is more positive in the low bTB risk (59%) compared to the high bTB risk area (47%). Pre-
movement tests in high risk areas meant that buyers in high risk areas do not value a voluntary scheme 
so highly, which is echoed also in seller responses to the scheme. In summary, confidence and support for 
this particular voluntary market-based initiative (and indeed public schemes) is spatially dependent, 
reflecting disease pressure and risk perception differences, as well as other farm-related factors. 
Recognising geographical differences in terms of farmer perceptions of bTB risk is important if we think 
about the wider ͚institutional logic͛ (HIGGINS et al., 2016) driving market-based instruments, which is 
essentially a neoliberal agenda that is about encouraging farmers to take more responsibility and to share 
some of the cost to control bTB through market-incentivised schemes (MAYE et al., 2014; ENTICOTT, 
2016). The general response from farmers to a voluntary risk-based trading scheme is lukewarm in LITTLE 
et al.͛s ;Ϯ017) study, particularly in high risk areas. Their study reveals potential limitations of voluntary-
based strategies because scheme uptake could be highly geographically varied and also varied among 
buyers and sellers. Significant uptake in high risk areas of such a voluntary scheme is very unlikely simply 
because pre-movement testing exists and is already quite strict. The negative responses from farmers in 
high risk areas to the scheme, explained in terms of fatalism, a perceived lack of control and a general low 
level of confidence, are further reasons to anticipate low uptake and are supported by other social science 
research examining measures to control bTB in wildlife in high risk areas (MAYE et al., 2014). In high bTB 
risk areas farmers have developed strategies to ͚liǀe ǁith͛ the disease, fatalistic that anything will ever be 
achieved to fully rid the area of the bTB problem.  
In terms of developing voluntary bTB initiatives it would make sense then, if such instruments are deemed 
to be the way forward, to start by developing them in low risk areas where there is more confidence and 
less fatalism about controlling the disease. A voluntary scheme might have some value in low risk areas in 
terms of improving information provision and encouraging greater transparency of herd health. It might 
help some sellers to differentiate themselves but it is also questionable whether a voluntary scheme 
would really help bTB control. The main limitation is a governance one: the scheme needs to be driven 
not by the market but by policy and regulation. This would ensure a more spatially coherent delivery of 
the initiative, which would potentially benefit impact and assessment of impact.  
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There are some interesting findings in the paper too about information sources, credibility, social norms 
and processes of risk communication. The study shows, for example, the importance of traditional 
markets for selling cattle. The private vet is noted as a credible and trusted source. It was interesting that 
members of breed societies and cattle health schemes tended to be more positive towards the initiative 
and young respondents too. There is plenty here that could be built upon if a voluntary initiative was to 
be developed. For example, there is a good deal of work on farmer influences that suggests the vet is a 
highly trusted source in relation to bTB and herd health generally (e.g. GUNN et al., 2008; see NAYLOR et 
al., 2017 for a review) and they could be an important conduit to communicate and encourage farmers. 
We know from wider work on ͚webs of influence͛ ;e.g. ORESZCZYN et al., 2010) that if an initiative is 
communicated properly through the right/trusted sources it has much more chance of been accepted and 
adopted ďǇ farŵers as a ͚good farŵiŶg͛ praĐtiĐe. So there is policy learning that can be taken from the 
paper to help build a potentially viable strategy, although I personally remain sceptical about the success 
of such an initiative unless it is more closely aligned with farmer beliefs, practices and geographical 
differences, especially if implemented as a voluntary-based mode of animal health governance. 
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